| Резюме: |
The doctrine of attitudes, which has almost completely captured and refashioned the science of social psychology, requires clarification. Historical considerations make it necessary to include a wide range of subjective determining tendencies among attitudes; yet it is possible and desirable to distinguish between attitudes and many correlative forms of readiness-for-response. Attitudes may be –idriving–n or –idirective, specific–n or –igeneral, common–n or –iindividual–n. They characteristically have a material or conceptual object of reference, and are "pointed" in some direction with respect to this object. If so generalized that the object and the direction are not identifiable, they merge into the "traits" of personality. Common attitudes can be roughly classified and measured, and when abstracted from the personalities which contain them they constitute the "socius," which is that portion of the unique personality of special interest to social science. Though attitudes are inferred rather than observed, they must be admitted as real and substantial ingredients in human nature, for without them it is impossible to account satisfactorily either for the consistency of any individual's behavior or for the stability of any society |